Re: UnixWare

[perry () snark imsi com (Perry E. Metzger)]

Carl Corey says:
> > If you eliminate suid programs, access to dangerous devices, and the
> > capacity to leave programs around for you the administrator to execute
> > (i.e. trojan horses), you've gone a long way towards making your
> > system inherently secure. Almost all defects in the security of public
> > access sites lie in one of these things, or in an obvious hole like
> > bad file permissions.
>
> I have everything secured as far as that goes.  I have set all permissions,
> regulated suid files, I have tcpwrapper and tripwire running, I also run a
> slightly modified COPS weekly, mailing any diff to me.  

This is NOT what I meant. I explicitly mean that you should go beyond
simply leaving the machine as shipped and should actively remove
existing SUID facilities to the extent possible and change all
persistant system processes to run unprivileged if at all possible. I
do not merely mean "regulating" SUID facilities. I really mean
actively yanking them out and replacing them with non-SUID facilities.
I also mean eliminating openings like world writable utmp files,
devices, etc.

If you do enough of that, you make your system inherently secure.

Perry